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ABSTRACT 
Misconceptions (also known as alternative conceptions) are a perennial problem in physics education. Research 
was focused worldwide on this, with limited successes achieved. The problem can be approached from different 
theoretical frameworks. This article identifies the following as historically predominant: the empirist-behaviorist, 
constructivist and student resource learning processes. These methods all lead to a dual epistemic, i.e. a physics 
vs. a pragmatic epistemic. A new hypothesis of the learning process in science is proposed, termed cognitive 
refinement. It identifies three levels of learning, viz. perceptual, conceptual and formal. Its implications for the 
science curriculum are discussed.  
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MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Students often perceive physics as a separate, isolated, academic world that differs from the real life 
they are living (Kruckenberg, 2006). In the science classroom, everyday concepts such as force and 
work have different meanings and obey other rules (laws and relationships) than outside it. For many 
students entering the science classroom, it may feel similar to entering a computer game or a Star Wars 
environment. As long as they apply the game's rules, they can succeed. When they leave the classroom 
(or switch off the computer), the "normal" concepts and rules are operative again. The irony is that 
science asserts that it describes the real world with concepts having their true meanings, and that 
scientific laws are the laws of nature. 
 
The question arises whether the Newtonian mechanics that students learn at school and introductory 
university really describes the world experienced by the learners. Unfortunately the answer is no. For 
instance, nowhere on earth do we find a frictionless plane or anything that keeps on moving with 
constant velocity. One of the most prominent alternative conceptions of students relates to these two 
unnatural phenomena of a frictionless plane and constant velocity motion, namely the conception that 
any moving object needs a force in the direction of motion to keep it going (Vosniadou et al., 2001). 
This alternative conception has been found amongst students from different cultures (Thijs & Van den 
Berg, 1995). It follows directly from learners’ experiences since early childhood, e.g. that when a toy 
car or block is pushed, it soon stops and when they ride a tricycle or bicycle, they have to keep pedaling 
(apply a force) to keep it going.  
 
Why do Newtonian mechanics start with the unnatural frictionless world and constant velocity motion? 
The answer lies in the nature of science and its development. Scientific knowledge is the result of a long 
history of public debate and critical exchange between highly specialized academic communities 
(Kruckenberg, 2006) that started about 300 years ago with Newton's Principia. In the positivist 
approach Physics developed into a formal, academic world that focuses on mathematical relations 
between quantities. To keep theory manageable, abstraction is used. In the scientific processes that 
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determine these mathematical relationships, some quantities are kept constant. Since the mathematics of 
an ideal situation is simpler (e.g. an ideal gas or a frictionless surface) it is used as a first approximation. 
When necessary, these ideal equations can be expanded to include additional factors such as friction or 
intermolecular forces. In physics we therefore use ideal situations in order to focus attention to specific 
relations and to simplify the mathematics. Consequently, Newtonian mechanics do not actually describe 
the real world in its complexity, but an ideal world of simple mathematical relations.  
 
The introductory physics curriculum follows a positivist order. Standard textbooks invariably 
commence with a chapter on measurement and units. Then the physical quantities (or concepts) are 
introduced and defined operationally one after the other with increasing mathematical complexity. 
Recent introductory textbooks that incorporate physics education research strategies (e.g. Knight, 2004, 
Tougher, 2006, Hewitt, 2002) still adhere to this positivistic order of presentation. Attempts to change 
the order of presentation (e.g. Chabey & Sherwood, 2004) did not get much support.  
 
During the past few decades, physics educators and researchers accepted the idea that students bring to 
the science classroom alternative or misconceptions that must be changed to the scientifically accepted 
concepts. The concept of force and Newton's laws are found to be particularly foreign to students 
(Vosniadou et al., 2001). The force-motion alternative conception that a force always acts in the 
direction of motion, is particularly resistant to change. Conceptual change theories have become the 
dominant theory guiding physics education research and a variety of strategies have been devised to 
improve the learning of physics (Tyson et al., 1997). A common notion of conceptual change strategies 
is that learners should become dissatisfied with their own conceptions which should be replaced with or 
transformed to the scientific ideas. An underlying perception is consequently that physics is the ultimate 
world of knowledge and all other ideas are alternatives or wrong.     
 
Students are often blamed for focusing only on some specific features, e.g. the person that exerts the 
force (Kruckenberg, 2006). Objectively seen, when Newtonian mechanics is introduced, it also focuses 
only on some features. Unfortunately these features differ from what students experienced as important. 
In the case of the toy car, the student may focus on the stopping of the car, while the teacher attends to 
its motion. Introducing Newton's first law, the teacher may show the learners a toy car (or block) 
moving over a rough table or carpet and ask what would happen if this car moved over a slippery tiled 
floor, an icy surface or in outer space (in this order). The teacher thus relates to everyday experiences 
and guides the students towards Newton's first law. After Newton’s first law is formulated and applied, 
his second law is introduced. In all the initial applications friction is neglected. The problem is that a 
frictionless world where most objects move at constant velocity is not part of the experience of students, 
which instead include friction and accelerated motion. When the teacher some weeks later adds that no 
work is done while holding your suitcase, the student whose arm gets tired from all the science books in 
the suitcase, feels really alienated. 
 
The obvious question is how should this discrepancy between the learners' world and that of classical 
mechanics be resolved. Some propose that we accept that students will function in two separate worlds 
inside and outside the science classroom (Kruckenberg, 2006) as if living in two separate cultures, 
while others deem it important to integrate these worlds. Possible ways of integration are to implement 
conceptual change strategies, emphasize the nature of science or bring the curriculum closer to the 
needs and interests of the students. Although these strategies are reported to have some success, many 
learners still tend to operate in separate worlds.   
 
Based on the cognitive model of information progression and developmental phases of learning we 
propose a strategy to incorporate physics into learners' experiential concepts. This strategy starts with 
the child’s world of experiences (pragma cosmos) and develops it into a conceptual understanding of 
these and other learning experiences, finally formalizing it into the mathematical world of physics 
(cosmos theoria). The focus is on the refinement of learners' existing cognitive structures instead of 
conceptual change.  
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Cognitive model of learning 
Over the past 50 years much has been learned from studies in cognitive science, neuroscience and 
education, about how the mind works and how learning takes place (Redish, 2003; Gagne, 1985). This 
knowledge influenced contemporary teaching and learning strategies. A cognitive model can be used to 
illustrate the working of the brain when learning takes place (Redish, 2003). Memory is a highly 
complex and structured phenomenon, but we'll only attend to some aspects of information-processing 
that is relevant for effective teaching. 
 
According to the cognitive model three memory components are active when learning, namely a 
sensory register, short-term or working memory and a long-term memory (Weiten, 2007). The 
stimulation that a learner receives from the environment is transformed to neural information that enters 
the sensory register where it persists for a very brief interval. Only some features of the ‘picture’ 
recorded in the sensory memory (selective perception) enters the short-term or working memory. 
Selective perception depends upon the learners’ ability to attend to certain features while ignoring 
others. Novice and experts in science may thus focus on different features of an event which they 
consider relevant (Gagne, 1985). 
 
The working memory serves as temporary store for incoming information and appears to be the part of 
our memory that we use for processing information and problem solving (Redish, 2003). The working 
memory is limited and has a short lifetime of only a few seconds. Search processes may be initiated in 
the working memory to retrieve material stored in the long-term memory by previous learning. 
According to Gagne (1985) a learning occurrence takes place when the stimulus situation together with 
the content of memory affect the learner is such a way that his or her performance changes.  
 
From the standpoint of learning, the most critical transformation of information occurs when it leaves 
the short-term memory and enters the long-term memory (Redish, 2003). The information available as 
certain perceptual features in short-term memory is now transformed (encoded) into a conceptual or 
meaningful mode. The information stored in the long-term memory is organized into knowledge 
structures. A knowledge structure is a pattern of association of knowledge elements. A pattern that 
tends to activate (made accessible to working memory) together with a high probability in a variety of 
contexts is often referred to as a schema. An example of a schema of motion is that objects tend to stop 
(Redish, 2003). Some of students' schemas formed before instruction may be more coherent than we as 
scientists tend to give credit for. Since new knowledge is built only by extending and modifying 
existing schemas, students’ existing knowledge is the raw material we have to work with to guide their 
learning.  
 
Developmental phases of learning 
From the cognitive model of learning emanated ideas of developmental levels or phases in learning. 
Three examples are concept learning of Gagne (1985) and Ausubel (1968), language learning (e.g. 
Weiten, 2007) and the Van Hiele theory of development of geometric thinking (Van Hiele, 1986). 
Gagne (1985) proposed stages of learning a concept. It begins with the discrimination of features of the 
concept from that of other concepts, followed by generalization of the concept by multiple experiences 
and finally mastering the concept when the relevant qualities have been abstracted and can be applied to 
new examples. Brookes (quoted by Gagne, 1985) argued that a learner is likely to acquire the initial 
concept representation from a particular instance, which may be the first (and not necessarily the best) 
instance. Subsequent encounters with other instances can bring about changes that may alter the stored 
representation of the concept toward a general perception. However, such changes will continue to 
depend upon the particular instances and situations encountered by the learner. 
 
From his studies of structure and insight in geometry learning, Van Hiele (1986) deduced a five-level 
hierarchy in the development of geometric thinking. The levels are: visualization, analyses, informal 
deduction, deduction and rigor. These levels are sequential, but not age-dependent in the sense of the 
 4
developmental stages of Piaget (Van de Walle, 2003). Geometric experience is considered as the 
greatest single factor influencing advancement through the levels. Instruction or language at a level 
higher than that of the student will result in a lack of communication which may cause rote learning. 
The Van Hiele theory became the most influential factor in American geometry learning (Van de Walle, 
2003).  
 
Weiten (2007) discussed milestones in language development. Features of human languages are that 
they are symbolic, generative and hierarchically structured. Apart from echoing sounds, three 
milestones in a child’s language development are morphemes, phrases and sentences. The smallest units 
of meaning obtained are morphemes that include root words as well as meaning-carrying units as the 
past-tense suffix 'ed'. The meaning of a word is broadened and generalized by using it in different ways. 
In the next phase the child combines words into phrases, after which he forms sentences. Complex rules 
of syntax govern the construction of phrases and sentences. These complex rules are studied by 
language specialists and researchers. A child’s language acquisition therefore develops from words that 
are given meaning by his/her experiences, to the building of relations between the words in phrases and 
then to form sentences that haven’t been used before. Sentences reveal the competency to use words 
with their correct meaning in the correct relation to other words and according to the rules of the 
language. Before they have mastered these competencies, it would be of no use to teach children formal 
linguistics and distinguish between verbs, nouns, etc. Children must first synthesize the words into 
sentences, before they can analyses these sentences.  
 
The following three aspects that emanate from the theoretical framework informed the hypothesis of the 
learning process proposed in this paper: 
a. Learning is a process of progressive construction of personal cognitive structures. 
b. All learning starts from experiences. Selective perception of attributes induces, strengthens or alters 
the formation of concepts. Formalization can only follow from a conceptual understanding. 
c. Learning is developmental. Learners should proceed through different phases in a definite order to 
master a concept. Previous phases are prerequisites for successful attainment of following phases.  
 
GENESIS OF LEARNING THEORIES 
 
To place the hypothesized learning process into perspective, three models of the learning of physics are 
discussed. These models are based on the empirist-behaviorist, conceptual change and student resource 
theories and are illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3.  
 
The empirist-behaviorist theory was dominant in the first half of the twentieth century, before the 
development of the cognitive model from neuroscience. The so-called traditional curriculum over-
emphasized experiences as the means of learning. In physics, carefully selected laboratory experiments 
were used to illustrate and confirm the formal theory of physics. This learning process is illustrated in 
Figure 1. Because learners' existing concepts formed from everyday experiences were not attended to, 
cognitive structures separate from learners' existing structures were formed in the physics classroom. 
Physics and reality seem to be parallel, but analogous universes.  
 
Constructivism is one of the major theories that built on the cognitive processes of learning. Ausubel, a 
forerunner of the present constructivist teaching approach (Trumper, 2003), asserted that “The most 
important single factor influencing learning is what the learner already knows. Ascertain this and teach 
him accordingl” (Ausubel, 1968).  Psychological educationalists agree that all learning commence with 
experiences (e.g. Ausubel, 1968; Gagne, 1985 and Vygotsky, 1986). Experimentation provides learners 
with both hands-on and minds-on experiences and is therefore an ideal way to enhance constructivist 
learning. Due to the cognitive model of learning, the constructivist theory emphasizes conceptual 
learning to precede formalization of concepts. The inclusion of conceptual understanding as a phase in 
the learning process (Figure 2) is a major progression from the empirist-behaviorist process (Figure 1). 
Actual learning is perceived to take place in the learners' working memory during the construction of 
cognitive structures (Redish, 2003).  Physics education researchers acknowledge the existence of 
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scientifically wrong structures formed by learners before (or even during) formal tuition and devise 
learning experiences for conceptual change of these so-called alternative conceptions. Conceptual 
change often involves discreditation of learners' existing cognitive structures by means of conflict 
situations (Scott et al., 1992). 
 
 
Figure 1: Empirist-behaviorist learning process 
 
 
Figure 2:  Conceptual change learning process 
Figure 3: Student resource learning process 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Cognitive refinement learning process 
 
Within the framework of inquiry and constructivism a variety of strategies for physics learning are 
found (Redish, 2003), e.g. microcomputer-based learning (e.g. Sokolof & Thornton, 1997), inquiry-
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based  learning (e.g.McDermott, 1996, Abd-el-Khalick et al., 2004); Socratic dialogue inducing 
laboratories (Hake, 1992), workshop physics (Laws, 1991), peer-learning (Fagen et al., 2002), problem-
solving (e.g. Leonard et al., 1999; Taconis & Broekenkamp,2001, Gaigher et al., 2006) and authentic 
science (Charney et al., 2007). Although successes have been reported by the implementation of various 
strategies, learners still seem to function in two separate worlds in and out of the physics classroom 
(Kruckenberg, 2006).  Learners' alternative conceptions are found to be extremely resistant to change 
(Driver et al., 1989) and the parallel-universe problem is not successfully resolved. Although learners' 
alternative conceptions are often brought to the open in the classroom, they are not effectively 
integrated with existing structures. 
 
Instead of focusing on learners' misconceptions and difficulties, Hammer (2000) advocated the use of 
learners' existing cognitive structures as resources for further learning. His proposal relates to the idea 
of "anchoring conceptions" of Clement et al. (1989), Minstrell's (1982) "bridging analogies" and the 
"refinement of intuition" described by Elby (2000).  These strategies use and modify learners' cognitive 
resources as raw material from which they may construct a physicist's understanding (Hammer, 2000). 
Features of student resource learning are illustrated in Figure 3. The epistemological-focussed 
curriculum of Elby (2000) was designed to integrate conceptual development with epistemological 
development. Students were helped to understand that learning physical laws involves refining one's 
intuitive ideas in order to reconcile them with physics. This idea is represented in Figure 3 by the arrow 
pointing from learners' concepts to the formal physics theory. 
 
A study of the strategies depicted in Figures 1,2 and 3 shows that two aspects were not taken into 
account. The first aspect is the personal experiences of the learners that caused the formation of their 
intuitive concepts. Conceptual change strategies try to reconcile learners' concepts with that of physics 
by learning experiences in the laboratory or classroom, and even by reference to real-life situations. 
These learning experiences however, focus on discrediting learners' existing concepts and convincing 
them of the correct physics, instead of starting with the experiences behind the alternative conceptions. 
For example, consider again the force-motion alternative conception and the teacher's strategy given 
previously. The teacher focuses the learners’ attention on the increasing distance of motion of the toy 
car in order to teach Newton's first law, and pays no attention to why it eventually stops or (if asked 
about it) casually asserts that it is "because of friction". According to the cognitive model, it is possible 
that the learner will not even extract his alternative conception from the long-term to the working 
memory, because no cues were used. Since the features that the teacher focuses on differ from those 
that caused the learners' alternative conceptions, a separate cognitive structure will be formed. 
However, this structure will possibly not make much sense to the learner or not be strong. Therefore it 
may be abandoned the next time that the learner sees an object stop, or gets tired when riding his 
bicycle. It must be remembered that the cognitive structures that the child has formed by repeated 
personal experiences provides him with satisfying explanations of phenomena and are therefore given 
prominence above those learned in the classroom. 
 
From this example it follows that it is of utmost importance for effective learning of physics, to start 
with everyday situations experienced by the learners that gave rise to the formation of the alternative (or 
better: primary) conceptions. In the beginning of the teaching of force and motion, the relevant primary 
conceptions should be retrieved and the learners should be guided towards an understanding of the 
scientific explanation of their experiences that caused them, e.g. the experiences that all moving objects 
on earth eventually stop and that a force must be exerted in the direction of motion to keep the objects 
going. The force of friction should therefore be introduced very early in the study of forces as 
explanation for their experiences. Thereafter, their attention can be focused to the abstracted (idealized) 
motion of objects and they can be guided towards the understanding of Newton’s laws. Throughout the 
learning, reference should be made to previous personal experiences, for example that a boy’s toy car 
can move at constant velocity along the pavement if he pulls it with a force equal to that of friction, and 
a girl’s doll pram can be pushed at constant velocity along the pavement. These examples explain why 
one has to exert a force to keep your bicycle going, etc. Learners who have pulled and pushed objects in 
the class and formed mental images of previous experiences (girl pushing her doll’s pram, and a boy 
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riding his bicycle), and understand the scientific explanations of these experiences, should more readily 
expand their existing knowledge structures permanently to incorporate scientific knowledge. The 
scientific concepts and learning experiences must be additional (not alternative) inputs to learning.  
Physics concepts should consequently be cognitively internalized by the students. This strategy is 
illustrated in Figure 4.    
 
Another aspect that should be taken into account is that novice learners perceive physics as an 
alternative universe (cosmos theoria) while their own experiential universe (cosmos pragma) is real. 
Learners' ideas cannot easily be transferred to the physics universe, as if by "religious" conversion. 
Physics should instead be built into their existing worlds. This is in accord with the cognitive model. In 
the learning process, the existing structures of the learners should be explicitly recalled into the working 
memory, and the new knowledge (physics) should be incorporated with them. This recall of existing 
structures can best be accomplished by the learning experiences that formed them in the first place. 
Focusing on the features that form learners' primary conceptions and giving scientific explanation for 
them, should be the first step in the learning process. We suggest the term perceptive learning for this, 
because perception is "the action by which the mind refers its sensations to external objects as cause" 
(Sykes, 1976). The next phase is the conceptual level, where learners' cognitive structures are refined by 
extension and guided to an understanding of physics concepts. At the formal level the conceptual 
structures are recalled and expanded to include formal physics, i.e. operational definitions and other 
mathematical relations as well as physical laws and models. Learning in the formal level should include 
the nature and processes of science, e.g. that complex real-life situations are simplified to determine the 
influence of different factors. In this phase, frequent reference should be made to the personal and 
laboratory experiences from which the second phase emanated. Otherwise physics will become just a 
manipulation of formulas and solving of formal problems that has nothing to do with everyday-life. 
 
CURRICULAR IMPLICATIONS 
 
The learning process illustrated in Figure 4 necessitates the re-thinking of the presentation of concepts 
such as force, as well as the order of presentation of the physics curriculum as a whole. Regarding the 
force concept, a conceptual understanding of the forces experienced in motion, including friction, 
should precede the formulation of Newton’s laws. It is also necessary that the entire physics syllabus is 
revised. Lemmer & Lemmer (2007) proposed on philosophical and didactical reasons that classical 
mechanics should commence with a study of the concept of energy, instead of force. A discussion of 
these examples of the order of presentation of force and Newton's laws, as well as classical mechanics, 
follows. 
 
The learning process of cognitive refinement can be applied to all fields of physics learning (e.g. 
mechanics, electricity) especially at school and introductory physics, where primary conceptions have 
to be refined to incorporate basic physics concepts and scientific explanations of phenomena. In 
electricity, for example, most learners think that the battery delivers electric current that is consumed by 
the bulb in the simple electric circuit. The perceived consumption of electric current is often 
counteracted in the science classroom by letting the learners measure the current in different places in 
the circuit. A conceptual conflict situation occurs when the measured current remains constant. The 
learners may remember this, but it does not make sense to them because it does not resolve their 
alternative conception. Their experience that the battery goes flat implies that something is consumed. 
Before learners can understand why the current remains constant in the series circuit (and form a proper 
cognitive structure), they must be given an explanation to their existing problem. This can be resolved 
by the scientific explanation that a battery becomes flat due to energy conversions in it, and that the 
bulb converts electrical energy into light and heat energy. With energy conversions identified as the 
"culprit" of the flat battery, they readily accept that the current can remain constant. A model (e.g. the 
“garden hose” model) to explain this, can aid in building the scientific perception of current.  
 
The examples from mechanics and electricity strengthen the argument that the physics curriculum 
should commence with the concept of energy before force or electric current is introduced (Lemmer & 
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Lemmer, 2007). This makes sense pedagogically in terms of the cognitive model and developmental 
phase theory.  Learners’ intuitive ideas about energy do not differ as much from its scientific expression 
as in the case of force or electric current. Trumper (1990 & 1991) presented  instructional strategies to 
guide learners’ creation of new scientifically correct schema based on their own preconceptions about 
energy. Duit (1981) proposed the use of semantic anchors to improve their everyday understanding of 
energy conservation. The scientific concept of force is, however, abstract and differs so much from 
everyday meanings (primary concepts based on experience) that concept development from learners' 
intuitive ideas (perceptions) are difficult.  Changing the order of the physics curriculum to commence 
with energy also makes sense in terms of learners’ perception of energy as causa motio and as internal 
drive and maintainer of motion. This perception only needs to be reinforced and extended, not changed. 
Introducing energy as the causa motio can prevent the formation of the force-motion alternative 
conception. Learning can then commence with the understanding that work has to be done to change an 
object's energy (W = ΔE). Then force can be introduced as the agent that does mechanical work. Force 
is then perceived as the changer of motion (causes acceleration). A conceptual instead of a positivist 
order of presentation of the physics curriculum should therefore start with energy, proceed with work 
and end with force and culminates into Newton’s laws. 
 
The most important aspect in the second phase of learning is generalization of the concept and the 
building of relations with other concepts in order to establish its scientific meaning. Since conceptual 
understanding precedes formalization, existential relations should be introduced before operational 
relations. For instance, the concept of work as the change in energy may form part of the second phase, 
while mechanical work as the vector product of force and displacement is formal and belongs to the 
third phase of learning.   
 
It is important to note that learners can be on different levels for different concepts simultaneously. For 
instance, they could already have formalized the concept of energy before the concept of electric 
current is introduced on the perceptual level. One should realize that all new learning, even that of an 
esteemed physicist, is much easier if they can form a mental image of a new concept or idea. These 
mental images should relate to previous experiences, in or out of the laboratory. That is the benefit of 
examples and illustrations.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although physics education researchers reported some successes in the implementation of a variety of 
constructivist teaching strategies, physics remains foreign to most learners, and learners often fall back 
to their existing alternative ideas. This implies that physics concepts have not been cognitively 
internalized and that learners live in "parallel universes" existing inside and outside of the classroom. 
The problem with current implementations of the cognitive model to physics learning, is that we as 
physicists look at the situation through our own schemas (a remark of Redish, 2003) instead of from the 
perspective of learning as the construction and reconstruction of personal schemas. Therefore we use 
formal experiences (e.g. in the laboratory) or formalize real-life experiences in order to form physics 
concepts instead of the everyday-life experiences (anchoring experiences) that caused learners' initial 
cognitive structures.  
 
From the cognitive model of learning follow two important aspects, namely that all learning starts with 
experiences and that learners build their own personal cognitive structures. Both these deductions 
should be considered when teaching physics. Over-emphasis of the experience and neglect of the 
knowledge structures, leads to the empirist-behaviorist ideas. On the other hand, the constructivists’ 
over-emphasis of the structure formation and neglect of personal experience leads to ineffective 
conceptual change theories. Everyday-experiences of learners, especially those that have been formed 
and strengthened repeatedly since early childhood, are resistant to change. The child cannot be 
transferred to the world of physics. The world of physics can only be built into (or grafted onto) his 
existing world. Consequently, his everyday experiences should form the starting point of learning if we 
want to transform them into scientifically correct structures. These conceptual structures can then be 
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refined towards formal physics that includes operational definitions, mathematical relations and 
problem solving.  
 
Personal real-life experiences form the anchoring experience, not only for the novice, but also for the 
expert, and on all three levels of learning. A conceptual understanding of these and other experiences 
(in the classroom or laboratory) form the second level of learning where learners are guided to 
generalize their experiences, understand the scientific concepts and form conceptual relationships 
between concepts. Contemporary strategies such as inquiry laboratories, peer-learning, authentic 
problems-solving, etc. can be used effectively on this level.  
 
To summarize: We contend that any learning strategy that results in a dual epistemic ("parallel 
universes" of reality and physics) is not effective. The current conceptual change theories are still based 
on this dual epistemic. The attempt to effect conceptual change is an attempt to transport learners 
cognitively from reality to theory, which is akin to a religious conversion. Instead of conceptual change, 
the teacher's task is to facilitate (guide) the grafting of scientific thinking onto the trunk of the pragmatic 
epistemic, thus refining the latter to formal scientific theory. This refinement can be a radical 
development, but should not lead to fundamentally different conceptions. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abd-el-Khalick, F., Boujaoude, S., Duschl, R., Lederman, N.G., Mamlock-Naaman, R., Niaz, M. 
Treagust, D. and Tuan, H. (2004). Inquiry in science education: International perspectives. Science 
education, 88, 397-419. 
 
Ausubel, D.P.  (1968).  Educational psychology: A cognitive view,  New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston. 
 
Chabay, R.W. and Sherwood, B.A. (2004).  Modern mechanics. American journal of physics, 72, 439-
445. 
 
Charney, J. Hmelo-Silver, C.E., Sofer, W., Neigeborn, L., Coletta, S. and Nemeroff, M. (2007). 
Cognitive apprenticeship in science through immersion in laboratory practicesw. International journal 
of science education, 29(5), 195-213. 
 
Clement, J., Brown, D.E. and Zietsman, A. (1989).  Not all preconceptions are misconceptions:  finding 
‘anchoring conceptions’ for grounding instruction on students’ intuitions.  International journal of 
science education,  11(special issue), 554-565. 
 
Driver, R., Guesne, E. and Tiberghien, A.  (1989).  Children’s ideas and the learning of science. In  
Driver, R., Guesne, E. and Tiberghien, A. (eds.),    Children’s ideas in science (pp.1-9; 193-201). 
Milton Keynes: Open University Press.   
 
Duit, R. (1981).  Understanding energy as a conserved quantity – remarks on the article by R.U. Sexi. 
International journal of science education, 3(3), 291-301. 
 
Elby, A. (2000). Helping physics students learn how to learn. American journal of physics Supplement, 
69(7), S54-S64. 
 
Fagen, A.P., Crouch, C.H. and Mazur, E. (2002). Peer instruction: Results from a range of classrooms. 
Physics teaching, 40, 206-209. 
 
Gagne, R.M. (1985). The conditions of learning. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
 
 10
Gaigher, E., Rogan, J.M. and Braun, M.W.H. (2006). The effect of a structured problem solving 
strategy on performance in physics in disadvantaged South African schools. African journal of research 
in SMT education, 10(2), 15-26. 
 
Hake, R.R. (1992). Socratic pedagogy in the introductory physics laboratory. The physics teacher, 30, 
546-552.  
 
Hammer, D. (2000). Student resources for learning introductory physics. American journal of physics 
Supplement, 68(7), S52-SW59. 
 
Hewitt, P.G. (2002). Conceptual physics, 9th edition, New York:Addison Wesley. 
 
Knight, R.D. (2004). Physics for scientists and engineers: A strategic approach. San Francisco: Pearson 
Addison Wesley. 
 
Kruckenberg, R. (2006). A Deweyan perspective on science education: Constructivism, experience and 
why we learn science. Science education, 15, 1-30. 
 
Laws, P. (1991). Calculus-based physics without lectures. Physics today, 44(12), 24-31. 
 
Lemmer, M. and Lemmer, T.N.  (2005).  Contextualisation as a didactical approach to physics 
education. In Grayson, D.J. (Ed.), What Physics should we teach?  Proceedings of the International 
Physics Education Conference, Durban, 5-8 July 2004, 212-218.  
 
Lemmer, M. and Lemmer, T.N. (2007). The role and place of energy in the physics curriculum. (Paper 
delivered at the GIREP Conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands from 20 – 25 August 2006). (Online at 
http://www.girep2006.nl/). 
 
Leonard, W.J., Gerace, W.J. and Dufresne, R.J. (1999). Concept-based problem solving: Making 
concepts the language of physics. Technical report: University of Massachusetts PER Group.  
 
McDermott, L.C. (1996). Physics by inquiry, 2 volumes, New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
 
Minstrell, J. (1982). Explaining the ‘at rest’ condition of an object. Physics teacher, 20, 10-20. 
 
Redish, E.F. (2003). Teaching physics with the physics suite, New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc.  
 
Scott, P.H., Asoko, H.M. and Driver, R.H. (1992). Teaching for conceptual change: A review of 
strategies. In Duit, R., Goldberg, F. and Niederer, H. (eds,). Research in physics learning: theoretical 
issues and empirical studies. Proceedings of an international workshop, March 1991.    
 
Sokolof, D.R. and Thornton, R.K. (1997). Using interactive lecture demonstations to create an active 
learning environment. Physics teaching, 35, 340-347. 
 
Sykes, J.B. (1976). The concise Oxford dictionary of current English, 6th Ed., Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
 
Taconis, R., Ferguson-Hessler, M.G.M., Broekenkamp, H. (2001). Teaching science problem solving: 
An overview of experimental work. Journal of research in science teaching, 38(4), 442-468. 
 
Thijs, G.D. and Van den Berg, E. (1995). Cultural factors in the origin and remediation of alternative 
conceptions in physics. Science and education, 4, 317-347. 
 
Tougher, J. (2006). Introductory Physics: Building understanding, New York, Wiley. 
 
 11
Trumper, R.  (1990).  Being constructive: an alternative approach to the teaching of the energy concept  
- part one.  International journal of science education, 12, 343-354. 
 
Trumper, R.  (1991).  Being constructive: an alternative approach to the teaching of the energy concept  
- part two.  International journal of science education, 13(1), 11-23. 
 
Trumper, R. (2003). The physics laboratory – A historical overview and future perspectives. Science 
and education, 12, 645-670. 
 
Tyson, L.M., Venville, G.J., Harrison, A.G. and Treagust, D.F. (1997). A multidimensional framework 
for interpreting conceptual change events in the classroom. Science education, 81, 387-404. 
 
Van de Walle, J.A. (2003). Elementary and middle school mathematics, Teaching development, Upper 
Saddle River, Merrill Prentice Hall. 
 
Van Hiele, P.M. (1986). Structure and insight, A theory of mathematics education, London, Academic 
Press. 
 
Vosniadou, S., Ionnides, C., Dimitrakopoulou, A. and Papademetriou, E. (2001). Designing learning 
environments to promote conceptual change in science. Learning and instruction, 11, 381-419. 
 
Vygotsky, L.S. (1986). Thought and language, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press. 
 
Weiten, W. (2007). Psychology: Themes and variations, Thomson Wadsworth, Belmont. 
 
 
Miriam Lemmer 
Senior lecturer 
Natural science, Mathematics and Technology Education Group 
School for Physical and Chemical Sciences 
North-West University 
Private Bag X6001 
2520 Potchefstroom 
South Africa 
E-mail: miriam.lemmer @nwu.ac.za 
 
Nico T. Lemmer 
North-West University 
Private Bag X6001 
2520 Potchefstroom 
South Africa 
E-mail: nico.lemmer@gmail.com 
